Supreme Court of Iowa Decision

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Case Title: Summary

Date: 07/08/2005

Number:

Decision: Listen to Audio Summary approximately 5 minutes in length.

Summary

Decisions of the Iowa Supreme Court
Filed on July 8, 2005
Prepared for the Iowa State Bar Association by
George F. Davison, Jr., J.D.
Š2005 The Iowa State Bar Association and George F. Davison, Jr., J.D.

Lack of Evidence to Support Claim of Premises Liability; Chief Justice and Two Justices Want Distinctions Between Invitee and Licensee Eliminated

Benham v. King, _____ N.W.2d _____ (Iowa 2005)(No. 163/03-1518)
A Black Hawk County District Court Judge granted a directed verdict for the defendant. Steve Benham suffered serious injuries to his head and neck when a dental chair in which he was seated collapsed. Benham argued that Dr. Ronald King failed to maintain his premises in a safe condition. The chair was at least nineteen years old at the time of the incident (It was placed in service in 1981. The incident occurred in 2000.). Dr. King had no prior problems with it. Inspection after the incident showed that a plastic housing located beneath the chair failed. At the close of evidence, the trial judge granted defendant’s motion for directed verdict. Benham appealed. The court of appeals found a jury issue on failure to inspect was generated. The Supreme Court granted further review.

The Supreme Court decision by Cady, J., affirms the district court. The Court observes the record fails to reveal any evidence to indicate that Dr. King should have known that he was exposing Benham to an unreasonable risk of harm. “Without such evidence, Benham cannot establish that King breached his duty of reasonable care.” The Court also writes, “Although King had a duty in this case to use reasonable care to discover the condition of the chair, there was no evidence he could have discovered the particular defect that cause the harm to Benham through the exercise of reasonable care. The important inquiry is not whether King should have been aware of some general potential for harm, but whether he should have been aware of the dangerous condition that resulted in the harm.”

Wiggins, J., writes a concurring opinion which is joined by Lavorato, C.J., and Streit, J. Justice Wiggins states, “I feel compelled . . . to write this special concurrence to discuss my concerns with the rules of liability under the invitee-licensee dichotomy as applied to the facts of this case.” The concurring opinion argues that “the antiquated common-law dichotomy with its contradictory and confusing rules” should be abandoned and replaced with “the modern rule requiring a possessor of land to exercise reasonable care under all the circumstances existing at the time and place of the injury for the protection of invitees and licensees.” Justice Wiggins observes, “Protecting a person’s life or limb should not depend on the person’s purpose for being on the land. This case is a perfect example as to why we should abandon the common-law dichotomy analysis in favor of a reasonable care standard.” (citation omitted)

Venue: Johnson County District Court Properly Moved Case to Grundy County

Richards v. Anderson Erickson Dairy Co., _____ N.W.2d _____ (Iowa 2005)(No. 63/04-0644)
In early 2001, Lorraine and Wade Richards suffered injuries in a chain-reaction collision on a highway in Grundy County. They filed lawsuit in Johnson County against Anderson Erickson Dairy Company, its employee-driver, and the owner and operator of another vehicle involved in the collision. AE and its driver moved for change of venue, contending that Johnson County was not the proper place to bring the lawsuit. The Johnson County District Court ordered the case moved to Grundy County. Trial in Grundy County resulted in a verdict for defendants. The Richards appealed.

The Supreme Court, Streit, J., affirms. Justice Streit first notes, “Iowa City must be a special place. The plaintiffs in this personal-injury action filed suit in Johnson County, notwithstanding the fact that it hardly had any connection to the case.” (In their reply brief, the Richards state, “Of course this court is fully aware of the strategy reasons that are back [sic.] of this litigation.”) The Richards argued that under section 616.8, Iowa Code, AE is a common carrier and could be sued in Johnson County because its trucks operate there frequently. The Court rejects this argument based upon Nickell v. District Court, 202 Iowa 408, 210 N.W. 563 (1926)(Nickell I) and Hinchcliff v. Dist. Ct., 204 Iowa 470, 215 N.W. 605 (1927)(Nickell II). The Court notes that the common carrier venue statute does not make that entity a resident of a county in which it operates for purposes of the Iowa venue statutes, and if there are resident defendants, the more specific venue provisions of sections 616.17 and 616.18, Iowa Code come into play. Iowa residents are entitled to have lawsuits against them prosecuted in counties where they reside (or in the case of a motor vehicle collision where it occurred). In this instance, Johnson County was not a proper venue. Polk County (where AE has its place of business), Story County (where the AE driver lived) or Grundy County (where the collision occurred) were proper venue locations under Iowa law. The Court also notes the venue provisions of Iowa law are statutes of convenience for defendants:

The Richards would have us overrule our precedents and reinterpret chapter 616 to permit a plaintiff to sue any Iowa resident who happens to have a common carrier as a codefendant in the remotest parts of the state, even though the chosen venue had no connection with the case. This interpretation would clearly promote forum shopping and inconvenience, and thereby frustrate legislative intent. It would also foster injustice because it would encourage plaintiffs to sue defendants in inconvenient venues as leverage in the settlement process. We will not sanction an interpretation of chapter 616 that would permit a plaintiff to transform statues of convenience into statues of inconvenience.

District Court Dismissal of Lawsuit for Failure to Serve Original Notice in Timely Manner Affirmed

Brubaker v. Estate of DeLong, _____ N.W.2d _____ (Iowa 2005)(No. 52/04-0079)
A motor vehicle collision involving Stacy Brubaker and Arthur DeLong occurred in Waterloo on April 11, 2001. DeLong died on August 20, 2002. On December 19, 2002, Brubaker filed a petition at law in the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County against DeLong. In an Order entered March 27, 2003, the district court noted that a Return of Service was not on file. Order directed Brubaker to obtain service by May 29, 2003. Eventually, five extensions to obtain service were granted plaintiff. On September 17, 2003, David Roth signed an acceptance of service on behalf of the estate (The estate was not opened, and Roth was not qualified as administrator until several days later.). The estate moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion. Plaintiff appealed. The court of appeals reversed finding there was timely service. The Supreme Court granted further review.

The Supreme Court, Wiggins, J., vacates the court of appeals decision and affirms the district court (modifying the order of dismissal to be without prejudice as required by Iowa law). The Court finds that the efforts to serve the defendant did not comply with the good cause standard of the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure.

. . . The district court was exceedingly generous in granting five extensions to Brubaker to obtain service on the defendant. The extensions granted by the district court gave Brubaker nine months from the date of filing the petition to effect service. Brubaker waited until the next to the last day to obtain the first acceptance from Roth. A simple check of the clerk of court records would have informed Brubaker that Roth was not the administrator of DeLong’s estate at the time of the first acceptance. At any time during those nine months, Brubaker could have petitioned the probate court to open an estate for Delong. See Iowa Code § 633.227.

The Court concludes that Brubaker failed to serve the original notice in a timely manner as required by rule 1.302(5) of the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure. Dismissal of the lawsuit without prejudice was the appropriate remedy.