Louie F. Beisser, Judge.

Appeal and cross-appeal from judgment for damages
arising from alleged sexual abuse by a father of his
daughter while she was a minor. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED
IN PART, AND REMANDED.

Alfredo Parrish and Andrew J. Dunn of Parrish,
Krudenier, Moss & Dunn, Des Moines, for appellants.

Jeane W. Pearson of Price, Breen & Pearson, Fort Dodge,
for appellees.

Considered by McGiverin, C.J., and Larson, Carter,
Neuman, and Snell, JJ.
McGIVERIN, C.J.
This appeal involves issues regarding whether an adult
daughter and her husband can recover damages against her
parents for sexual abuse and loss of consortium, without
being barred by the relevant statutes of limitations and
the loss of consortium requirement that the injuries to the
daughter have occurred during the marriage.
We conclude that substantial evidence in this bench
trial of a law action supports the trial court's finding
that the father sexually abused his daughter on November 7,
1987. Also, like the trial court, we conclude that Iowa
Code section 614.8A (1991) permitted the daughter to bring
this action against her father for damages for her injuries
caused by the sexual abuse she suffered on that date, and
that the action against her mother should be dismissed.
However, we disagree with the trial court's
determination that the discovery rule applies to the
husband's loss of consortium claim and, therefore, conclude
that her husband did not have a cause of action against the
father for loss of spousal consortium.
I. Background facts and proceedings.
A. Family history. Beverly Jo Claus (Beverly Jo)
was born on March 5, 1974 to Richard and Beverly Whyle.
Beverly Jo was Richard Whyle's (Richard's) eighth of eleven
children.
Richard is a baker. He usually works from four o'clock
in the morning until mid-afternoon and returns to work at
nine-thirty in the evening to finish his duties. While
Richard is home in the afternoon, he regularly takes a
nap. When Beverly Jo lived at her parents' home, she took
naps with him on different occasions.
Besides being a professional baker, Richard is also his
family's "doctor." He delivered two of his own children.
Additionally, before seeking the services of a professional
doctor, he performed preliminary checks on any ailing
members of his family.
Richard was a strict disciplinarian with his children.
He expected them to mind and, when they did not, he used a
belt on them. Richard admitted he had used excessive force
on his children on some occasions.
Richard regularly argued with his wife Beverly. He
often got mad and threw things. Due to such arguments, on
several occasions Beverly took the children and left the
home until tempers had cooled down.
In 1986, the Whyle family was investigated by the
Department of Human Services. Richard told the
investigator he had brushed his hands against Beverly Jo's
breast. Nothing came of the investigation.
By the time Beverly Jo was twelve or thirteen years
old, her parents found her to be an obstreperous child.
She would not mind them. She was working at a restaurant;
but she would stay out past her working hours and not
return home until four o'clock in the morning, the same
time she knew her father went to work. Although she was
getting "B"s and "C"s while she was in the eighth grade,
her grades and attendance gradually went down until she
dropped out of school during her first semester in the
ninth grade.
Beverly Jo was an emotionally unstable teenager. She
has tried to commit suicide several times, her first
attempt occurring when she was thirteen years old. Around
four o'clock in the morning on November 10, 1987, she took
an overdose of Tylenol, causing her to vomit most of the
day. Although Beverly Jo's parents were aware of her
overdose and tried to get her to eat something, her mother
did not take Beverly Jo to the hospital until around
nine-thirty that evening.
While at the hospital, Beverly Jo told the intake nurse
about an incident, a game Richard called "tit twister,"
which occurred while the Whyle family was on vacation.
Beverly Jo complained that in 1983 while her family was
traveling in their Suburban, her father had put his hand
under her shirt and on her breast. She said she felt
humiliated and depressed and had told her mother about what
had happened.
On November 12, 1987, Beverly Jo was transferred and
admitted to the Mary Greeley Medical Center (Medical
Center) in Ames. She was put in the child psychiatric
ward. While there, she provided the personnel the same
information about her father's "tit twister" game that she
had provided before to the intake nurse at the first
hospital. She also took another overdose of medicine.
When questioned by the doctors at the Medical Center,
Richard denied any physical or sexual abuse of Beverly Jo.
Although the hospital records indicate that Richard was
going to file a Child in Need of Assistance (CHINA)
petition, none was ever filed.
Beverly Jo was discharged and taken home from the
Medical Center on February 2, 1988.
In 1989, Beverly Jo moved out of the family home and
into an apartment. She met her husband Aaron at her
apartment building in May or June of that year.
Subsequently the couple moved in together and three weeks
later, on September 20, 1989, were married in Missouri. At
that time, Aaron was seventeen and Beverly Jo was fifteen
years of age.
In the spring of 1990, Beverly Jo again attempted to
take her life but was successfully treated at a hospital
emergency room.
B. Beverly Jo's flashback memories of sexual abuse.
In the fall of 1990, Aaron and Beverly Jo moved to
Alabama. Around this time, Beverly Jo began having
flashbacks about the physical and sexual abuse allegedly
inflicted upon her by her father.
Beverly Jo had her first such flashback in the latter
part of 1990 or the first part of 1991. During this
flashback, she remembered an incident that took place in
her bedroom on November 7, 1987 when she was thirteen years
old. She remembered she was in her bed when Richard came
into her room, placed his hand on her stomach, and inserted
his finger in her vagina. She remembered she was awake at
the time, although feigning sleep. She also remembered
that the next morning there was blood on her sheets and
that she was walking hunched over. As mentioned, three
days after the date of this remembered sexual assault,
Beverly Jo made her first suicide attempt. After this
flashback, Beverly Jo told her husband about the remembered
sexual abuse and about her father's past behavior of
touching her breasts.
Thereafter, the couple moved back to Iowa. Beverly Jo
testified that she has had several more flashbacks since
their return to Iowa. First, in the summer of 1991,
Beverly Jo claims she remembered that in 1982 her father
burned her arm on a stove and forced her to disrobe and
shower with him; she testified she recalled touching her
father's inner thigh near his groin and crying.
During the next year, she asserts that she first
recalled that in 1980 or 1981 her father forced her and her
family to disrobe and to walk away from home through the
woods to the road. That same year, she claims to have also
recalled that from 1979 through 1989 she was required by
her father to lie down in his bed and nap with him, and
that he clamped his legs and arm around her with his hand
under her shirt on her stomach and chest.
Finally, in 1993, Beverly Jo contends that she had
several flashbacks, remembering that her father stripped
her naked in his car at night while they were alone and
that on two separate occasions during the years 1985
through 1987 her father touched her breasts in front of
other family members.
Even before these flashbacks, since the beginning of
Beverly Jo and Aaron's relationship, Aaron has not been
able to touch certain places on Beverly Jo's body without
her getting hysterical. Notwithstanding the fact that
Beverly Jo and Aaron have two children, the oldest born
August 24, 1991 and the youngest born November 8, 1992,
they do not have what Aaron would consider a normal sexual
relationship. Beverly Jo is unable to relax and have
intimate relations with her husband. They do have sexual
contact, but no foreplay or enjoyment in the process.
In addition, Beverly Jo has several other problems
allegedly related to her being abused. She has difficulty
sleeping, has bad dreams, and while awaking is combative
and feels disoriented. When she is fully awake, she is
tearful and unable to go back to sleep. She fears being
home alone without her husband, as she feels her father
will try to get back at her. She has mood swings and
looses control of her temper with her flashbacks. Outside
the home, she has problems making friends and cannot go to
work. She feels others are looking at her, especially
males who might have some sort of sexual ideas or make
references with sexual overtones towards her.
Beverly Jo has seen several therapists and doctors
since she has started having the flashbacks of physical and
sexual abuse. Dr. Scholten, who cared for Beverly Jo in
1987 after her first suicide attempt and later after her
flashbacks, diagnosed her with a post-traumatic stress
disorder. He determined the major cause of her
post-traumatic stress disorder is the abuses which have
been inflicted on her, with the family chaos being a
contributing factor to her condition. He has recommended
ongoing therapy with a qualified psychotherapist.
C. Present suit. On November 20, 1991, plaintiffs
Beverly Jo and Aaron brought suit against both defendants
Richard and Beverly, alleging assault and battery and
physical and sexual abuse against Richard, and negligence
in failing to prevent such abuse against Beverly. Aaron
also claimed loss of consortium due to Richard's alleged
abuse of Beverly Jo.
Defendants denied all of plaintiffs' claims and alleged
that Beverly Jo's claims were barred by the statutes of
limitations contained in Iowa code sections 614.1(2) and
614.8. Defendants also argued that Aaron could not recover
for loss of consortium because any alleged injuries to
Beverly Jo were not incident to their marriage.
The trial court found and concluded Richard committed
an assault and battery on Beverly Jo in the form of sexual
abuse when her father put his finger in her vagina on
November 7, 1987. The court determined that the statute of
limitations in Iowa Code section 614.8A permitted Beverly
Jo to bring this action against her father for the sexual
abuse he committed on that date. As to her 1983 breast
touching claim against her father, the court found and
concluded that the statutes of limitations contained in
Iowa Code sections 614.1(2) and 614.8 barred the claim.
Regarding Beverly Jo's negligence claim against her
mother, the trial court found that Beverly Jo failed to
meet her burden of proof as it relates to Beverly and
concluded that there was insufficient evidence that Beverly
knew about the alleged sexual abuse by her husband in
Beverly Jo's bedroom.
Finally, the court concluded that Aaron was permitted
to recover on a claim for loss of spousal consortium
against Richard.
On the basis of these findings and conclusions, the
trial court entered judgment for plaintiff Beverly Jo,
awarding her $53,202 in actual damages against defendant
Richard for her medical expenses, past and future pain and
suffering, and emotional distress due to the November 7,
1987 incident. The court also awarded Beverly Jo $10,000
in punitive damages against Richard for the same
intentional act. Regarding plaintiff Aaron's consortium
claim, the court entered judgment for Aaron against Richard
for $7,500. The court dismissed plaintiffs' petition
against defendant Beverly.
From this trial court judgment, defendant Richard
appealed. Plaintiffs cross-appealed against both
defendants.
II. Scope of review. We review a case tried at law
in the district court on errors assigned. Iowa R. App. P.
4; Atwood v. City of Des Moines, 485 N.W.2d 657, 659 (Iowa
1992). We view the evidence in its light most favorable to
the judgment, and we construe the findings of the trial
court liberally to uphold, rather than defeat, the result
reached. DeYarman v. State, 226 N.W.2d 26, 27 (Iowa 1975)
(citations omitted). The trial court's findings of fact
have the effect of a special verdict, Iowa R. App. P. 4,
and are binding on us if supported by substantial
evidence. Iowa R. App. P. 14(f)(1); Cronk v. Iowa Power &
Light Co., 258 Iowa 603, 606, 138 N.W.2d 843, 844 (1966).
We are not, however, bound by the trial court's
determinations of law, nor are we precluded from inquiry
into whether the trial court's ultimate conclusions were
materially affected by an improper conclusion of law.
Atwood, 485 N.W.2d at 659.
III. Battery and sexual abuse occurring on November 7,
1987. Beverly Jo claims Richard committed a battery or
unpermitted touching against her which constituted sexual
abuse on November 7, 1987. The trial court agreed and
concluded that the statute of limitations contained in Iowa
Code section 614.8A permitted her to bring this action
against her father. We conclude that substantial evidence
supports the trial court's finding that Richard sexually
abused Beverly Jo on November 7, 1987 and that by virtue of
Iowa Code section 614.8A, the appropriate statute of
limitations, she could bring this action against him for
the injuries she has suffered due to that abuse.
A. Sufficiency of the evidence. Defendants argue
that Beverly Jo's evidence offered to support her
allegations of sexual abuse occurring on November 7, 1987
is neither substantial nor credible, and thus does not
support the trial court's finding and conclusion that
Richard committed a battery and sexual abuse against
Beverly Jo when he inserted his finger in her vagina on
November 7, 1987. (1) Defendant did not object at trial to the fact that
Beverly Jo's testimony about the November 7, 1987 incident
was based on a "flashback" Beverly Jo had approximately
three years after the incident.

We disagree.
Defendant's argument relies heavily on the fact that
Beverly Jo's family provided some negative testimony
regarding Beverly Jo's character and honesty, and that
Beverly Jo's testimony itself contained some
inconsistencies. However, the trier of fact, in this case
the trial court, has the prerogative to determine which
evidence is entitled to belief. See DeYarman, 226 N.W.2d
at 29. Factual disputes depending heavily on credibility
of witnesses are best resolved by the trial court, which
has a better opportunity to evaluate credibility than do
we. See Capitol Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. First Financial Sav.
& Loan Ass'n, 364 N.W.2d 267, 271 (Iowa App. 1984). We
will not weigh the evidence or the credibility of the
witnesses. Hackney v. Tower, 260 Iowa 1101, 1105, 152
N.W.2d 257, 259 (1967).
Rather, our question is whether there was substantial
evidence to support the findings of the trial court
according to those witnesses whom the trial court
believed. DeYarman, 226 N.W.2d at 29. Obviously, the
trial court believed Beverly Jo's version of the events
occurring on November 7, 1987. Her testimony provides
substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding
battery in the form of sexual abuse on that date.
B. Statute of limitations. Richard argues that Iowa
Code sections 614.1(2) (two-year limitations period) and
614.8 (one-year extension of two-year limitations period
after termination of minority) are the proper statutes of
limitations in this case. He contends that plaintiff had
to bring her action by September 20, 1990, or within one
year after she was emancipated by her marriage on September
20, 1989. The trial court, however, concluded that Iowa
Code section 614.8A is the proper statute of limitations.
We agree with the trial court.
Iowa Code section 614.8A provides as follows:
An action for damages for injury suffered as
a result of sexual abuse which occurred when the
injured person was a child, but not discovered
until after the injured person is of the age of
majority, shall be brought within four years from
the time of discovery by the injured party of both
the injury and the causal relationship between the
injury and the sexual abuse.

The incident Beverly Jo remembered occurring on
November 7, 1987 constituted sexual abuse within the scope
of Iowa Code section 614.8A. "Sexual abuse" is defined in
Iowa Code section 709.1 in relevant part as any sex act
between persons when one of the persons is a child. (2) We have previously determined in Doe v. Cherwitz, 518 N.W.2d 362, 364 (Iowa 1994), that the term "sexual abuse"
as used in section 614.8A is to be defined by the criminal
code, specifically by section 709.1.
Iowa Code Sec. 709.1(3) (emphasis added). In this context, a child
is any person under the age of fourteen years. Id. at
702.5; Doe v. Cherwitz, 518 N.W.2d 362, 364 (Iowa 1994)
(holding that "child" for purposes of Iowa Code section
709.1(3) and thereby section 614.8A means someone under the
age of fourteen as defined by section 702.5). Being only
thirteen years of age on November 7, 1987, Beverly Jo was
still a child as contemplated by section 614.8A when the
incident occurred.
"Sex act" is defined in Iowa Code section 702.17 in
relevant part as "any sexual contact between two or more
persons by . . . contact between the finger or hand of one
person and the genitalia or anus of another person."
Richard's insertion of his finger into his child's vagina
corresponds with this definition of "sex act" in section
702.17. Consequently, Richard's action on November 7, 1987
was "sexual abuse" as provided by section 614.8A.
In addition to the November 1987 incident falling
within the scope of section 614.8A, Beverly Jo's cause of
action for such sexual abuse meets that statute of
limitations' requirements. Beverly Jo remembered the
November 7, 1987 abuse in a flashback which itself occurred
in the latter part of 1990 or the first part of 1991. At
this time, Beverly Jo had attained her majority by virtue
of her marriage to Aaron on September 20, 1989. See Iowa
Code Sec. 599.1 ("[A]ll minors attain their majority by
marriage."). Thus, although the sexual abuse happened when
Beverly Jo was thirteen, she did not "discover" the abuse
until she was a legal adult. Shortly thereafter,
specifically on November 20, 1991, she commenced the
present action against her parents. As section 614.8A
allows an adult to bring an action up until four years
after discovery of sexual abuse, Beverly Jo is well within
the statute of limitations of section 614.8A relative to
the November 7, 1987 incident.
We, therefore, conclude that the trial court properly
allowed Beverly Jo to bring an action against her father
for the November 7, 1987 abuse and correctly rejected
defendants' argument that the proper statutes of
limitations for this incident were Iowa Code sections
614.1(2) and 614.8.
C. Damages to Beverly Jo. In determining damages
for the plaintiff Beverly Jo, the trial court confined
itself to the November 7, 1987 incident. The trial court
awarded Beverly Jo $53,202 in actual damages for her
medical expenses, past and future pain and suffering, and
emotional distress. The court also awarded Beverly Jo
$10,000 in punitive damages due to Richard's intentional
act.
Richard argues that the court's damage awards are
lacking in evidential support and are erroneously based on
alleged incidents of abuse other than the November 1987
incident. Plaintiffs contend the damages are inadequate.
We will not set aside or alter a judgment regarding
damages unless it is (1) flagrantly excessive or
inadequate, or (2) shocks the conscience or sense of
justice, or (3) raises a presumption it is the result of
passion, prejudice or other ulterior motive, or (4) lacks
evidential support. Holmquist v. Volkswagen of America,
Inc., 261 N.W.2d 516, 524 (Iowa App. 1977) (emphasis
added). In reviewing damage awards, we consider the
evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Ort
v. Klinger, 496 N.W.2d 265, 269 (Iowa App. 1992).
We conclude that the trial court's damage awards to
Beverly Jo do not lack evidential support. The trial court
concluded that Beverly Jo should have ongoing weekly
psychotherapy sessions for several years at a charge of
$166 per hour and a medical review on a quarterly basis at
a charge of $54 a quarter. These medical expenses alone
will total over $25,000. In addition, the trial court
concluded that Beverly Jo has suffered and will suffer
severe emotional distress, stating:

There was much testimony presented relating
to Beverly Jo's emotional state . . . . Clearly
in this case the pain and suffering Beverly Jo has
endured is severe. She suffered sexual abuse in
her bedroom as a child, which was so extreme that
her mind involuntarily repressed any memories of
it. She later had flashbacks of this abuse. She
was subjected to the horrifying memories of what
had occurred. As a result of this, Beverly Jo
became severely traumatized as evidenced by her
pattern of behavior. She is withdrawn, afraid of
being alone, and afraid of men. It is difficult
for her to endure physical contact with her
husband and children, and she has had several
bouts with suicidal attempts. Indeed, the ability
for Beverly Jo to enjoy a normal life and pursue
happiness for herself has been severely
diminished.

With such findings of fact in mind, we conclude
substantial evidence supported the trial court's award of
$53,202 actual damages to Beverly Jo. Further, we reject
Richard's argument that the trial court based its award on
more than one act of sexual abuse, as the evidence supports
the court's determination that the November 7, 1987
incident caused all of her awarded damages. We also reject
Beverly Jo's assertion that the award is inadequate.
We also conclude that the court's award of punitive
damages to Beverly Jo complied with the requirements of
Iowa Code chapter 668A and the factors stated in Ezzone v.
Ricardi, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Iowa 1994). A preponderance of
clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence in the record
shows that Richard's conduct was willful and in wanton
disregard for Beverly Jo's rights. See Iowa Code Sec.
668A.1(a). Although the trial court did not explicitly
make such a finding, willful and wanton disregard for
Beverly Jo's rights is implicit in the nature of the act of
sexual abuse Richard committed. Similarly, the fact that
Richard's actions towards Beverly Jo were intentional
necessarily implies that his conduct was directed
specifically at her, causing the full $10,000 of punitive
damages to be paid to Beverly Jo. See id. Sec. 668A.1(1)(b) &
(2)(a).
IV. Beverly Jo's other claims of physical abuse. In
addition to the sexual abuse inflicted on Beverly Jo on
November 7, 1987, Beverly Jo alleges several other
incidents of physical abuse, including allegations that
Richard touched her breasts, forced her to "nap" with him,
and showered with her. For the reasons stated below, we
agree with the trial court that Beverly Jo is not entitled
to recover for these claims.
A. Allegations of breast touching occurring in 1983
barred by Iowa Code sections 614.1(2) and 614.8. Beverly
Jo contends that she has a claim for an alleged incident
occurring in 1983 when her father played a game he called
"tit twister" and touched her breasts. The trial court
correctly found and concluded that Beverly Jo was aware of
this incident and its abusive nature in 1987 and thus her
failure to bring an action within the time limitations set
forth in Iowa Code sections 614.1(2) and 614.8 bar her
action.
Iowa Code section 614.1(2) provides an action may be
brought for "[t]hose founded on injuries to the person or
reputation, including injuries to relative rights, whether
based on contract or tort, or for a statute penalty, within
two years."
Iowa Code section 614.8 provides an additional year for
minors:
The times limited for actions herein, except
those brought for penalties and forfeitures, shall
be extended in favor of minors and mentally ill
persons, so that they shall have one year from and
after the termination of such disability within
which to commence said action.

As Beverly Jo's accusation of Richard touching her
breasts would be a tort, her claim would fall within the
scope of these statutes of limitations. However, the trial
court found that she was aware of her alleged injury and
its abusive nature at the latest in 1987 when she related
the incident to hospital personnel. As previously
mentioned, Beverly Jo reached her majority on September 20,
1989 when she married her husband Aaron. Accordingly, the
statutes allowed her to bring her action for the breast
touching one year from that date. She failed to do that;
she did not bring the present action until November 20,
1991. (3) In addition, even if Beverly Jo's allegations of
breast touching constituted sexual abuse within the scope
of the aforementioned Iowa Code section 614.8A, she could
not bring her claim under that statute. In order to bring
an action under that statute, the victim must not have
"discovered" the sexual abuse until reaching majority. See
Iowa Code Sec. 614.8A. As stated, Beverly Jo was aware of the
alleged 1983 breast touching and its abusive nature in
1987, two years before she reached her majority.

The trial court was thus correct in barring her
battery claim for breast touching in 1983.
B. Allegations of other physical abuse. Beverly Jo
alleges that she has had several other flashbacks in which
she has remembered her father committing various acts of
abuse against her. The trial court failed to determine
whether Beverly Jo could recover for these claims,
confining its decision to the November 7, 1987 vaginal
penetrating and the 1983 breast touching. It is well
settled that an Iowa rule of civil procedure 179(b) motion
is essential to preservation of error when a trial court
fails to resolve an issue, claim, defense, or legal theory
properly submitted to it for adjudication. Estate of
Grossman v. McCreary, 373 N.W.2d 113, 114 (Iowa 1985).
Beverly Jo did not meet this requirement because she failed
to file a motion to enlarge or amend the findings of the
trial court pursuant to rule 179(b). Accordingly, she has
waived these issues on appeal.
V. Beverly Jo's claim of negligence against her
mother Beverly. Besides Beverly Jo's claims against her
father, she also contends that her defendant mother,
Beverly Whyle, had an affirmative duty to protect and
defend Beverly Jo from harm, and was negligent when she
failed to so defend and protect Beverly Jo from her
father's abuse. She asserts the trial court erred in
dismissing her petition against Beverly.
Regarding this claim, the trial court found as a fact
that "Beverly Jo has failed to meet her burden of proof"
and that "[t]here is no evidence [defendant Beverly] knew
about the sexual abuse involving her husband in Beverly
Jo's room." Because the trial court found as a fact that
Beverly did not know about the November 7, 1987 incident,
in order to prevail on appeal Beverly Jo would have to show
as a matter of law that Beverly was negligent. See Anthony
v. State, 374 N.W.2d 662, 664-65 (Iowa 1985). We conclude
that she has failed to meet this burden. There is no merit
to this assignment.
VI. Aaron's claim for loss of consortium. In
addition to Beverly Jo's claims for damages, her husband
Aaron alleged that he is entitled to recover for loss of
spousal consortium. Rejecting defendant Richard's argument
that Aaron does not have the right to sue for loss of
consortium for an injury that was actually inflicted upon
his wife prior to their marriage, the trial court awarded
Aaron $7,500 for loss of spousal consortium. We disagree
with the trial court's decision and conclude that Aaron
does not have a valid claim for loss of spousal consortium.
In Doe V. Cherwitz, 518 N.W.2d 362, 364-65 (Iowa
1994), (4) In fairness to the district court, we note that Doe
v. Cherwitz had not yet been decided when the district
court entered judgment in the present case.
we addressed the same issue presented here and
chose not to allow "recovery for loss of consortium when
the original act occurred prior to marriage [even though]
the damage was not discovered until afterward." Id. at
365. We reasoned that:

The discovery rule anticipates that the
claimant had a valid cause of action within the
period of limitations, but for some reason, was
unaware of it. Here, because there was no marital
relation between [the parties], there was no cause
of action within the period of limitations, and
the discovery rule cannot create one when none had
ever existed during the period of limitations.

Id. (citation omitted).
In the present case, Aaron and Beverly Jo were not
married until September 20, 1989, approximately two years
after Richard "actually" sexually abused Beverly Jo on
November 7, 1987. Without a marital relationship on
November 7, 1987, Aaron did not have a right to bring an
action for spousal consortium at that time. See Beeck v.
Aquaslide 'N' Dive Corp., 350 N.W.2d 149, 167 (Iowa 1984).
Accordingly, the discovery rule is inapplicable, leaving
Aaron without an action for loss of consortium. See
Cherwitz, 518 N.W.2d at 365. The court should have
dismissed Aaron's claim.
VII. Conclusion. We have considered all other
contentions and arguments made on the appeal and
cross-appeal, whether or not specifically addressed in this
opinion, and either find error not preserved or no merit to
those assignments.
We affirm the judgment of the district court relating
to plaintiff Beverly Jo Claus' claims for damages against
defendant Richard Whyle and its dismissal of the petition
against defendant Beverly Whyle. We reverse the judgment
relating to plaintiff Aaron Claus' claim for loss of
consortium. The case is remanded for entry of judgment
consistent with this opinion. Costs shall be taxed
one-half to appellant Richard Whyle and one-half to
appellees.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.