Employer Liable for Civil Damages for Violation of Iowa Law Regarding Employment Drug Testing

Tow v. Truck County of Iowa, Inc., _____ N.W.2d _____ (Iowa 2005) (No. 3/04-0462)
Thomas Tow sought a job at Truck Country of Iowa, Inc. He was offered a job, subject to passing a pre-employment drug test. The initial test was inconclusive. The company told Tow he could take another test at his expense. If he passed, he would be employed. Tow filed a lawsuit in the Iowa District Court for Linn County contending Truck Country violated Iowa law. A judge granted Tow summary judgment on the issue of whether or not Truck County could require him to pay for the second drug test, and damages, including attorney fees, were awarded. Truck County appealed.

The Supreme Court, Carter, J., affirms the district court. The Court notes that section 730.5, paragraph 6(b), Iowa Code provides, “An employer shall pay all actual costs for drug or alcohol testing of employees and prospective employees required by the employer.” The Court holds that as a matter of law if Truck Country was to require a drug test as a condition to employ Tow, it had to pay for it, including re-testing.

The Court affirms damages awarded by the district court. The damage award is based upon what Tow would have earned during two years working for Truck Country reduced by what he actually earned in other positions. The Court also finds the district court was correct when it awarded Tow attorney’s fees. The Court rejects arguments that Tow failed to mitigate damages by failing to advance the costs for the second drug test.


City of Sioux City Is Immune from Liability for Design and Maintenance of a Storm Sewer System

Fischer v. City of Sioux City, _____ N.W.2d _____ (Iowa 2005) (No. 36/03-1431)
Seven families who live near the intersection of Sergeant Road and Waldon Avenue in Sioux City claimed the city was negligent in the design and maintenance of a storm sewer system. A July 1999 rain storm produced excess surface water in the area. Water backed up into the basements of the families’ homes. The families contended that the city was negligent in the design of the storm sewer system when it was constructed in 1973, and that the city failed to provide necessary improvements after it allowed construction of Southern Hills Mall and other commercial developments nearby.

The Woodbury County District Court determined that the storm sewer was constructed in accordance with generally recognized engineering standards as they existed in 1973. The district court also found the city’s decision to use detention ponds to address problems that might occur with additional run off was reasonable. The district court concluded the city was immune under section 670.4(8), Iowa Code, and it granted judgment for the city. The plaintiffs appealed.

The Supreme Court, Wiggins, J., affirms. The heart of the plaintiffs’ argument is that the city should have used sixty-six inch pipe rather than sixty inch pipe when it built the storm sewer. The burden of proof is on the plaintiffs to establish that the city did not use generally recognized engineering standards, and the Court finds that the system as designed and built in 1973 complied with then existing engineering standards. The city acted reasonably when in 1984 it required future non-residential developments in the area to create detention ponds. The city provided substantial evidence from which the district court could find that the detention ponds in conjunction with the storm sewer system was properly designed and maintained. The district court was correct when it found the city was immune and granted judgment for the city.


Domestic Abuse Assault Conviction Affirmed

State v. Williams, _____ N.W.2d _____ (Iowa 2005) (No. 22/04-0126)
Williams was found guilty in the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County on third offense, domestic abuse assault. He argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction and that his trial counsel was ineffective.

The focus at trial and on appeal was Williams’ spouse, Raegen. She called 9-1-1 and advised that Williams was choking her. When police arrived, they found her agitated and crying. She claimed Williams had choked her with both hands. She had an inch-long red mark on her throat. She gave a written statement that described the incident. Prior to trial, Raegen recanted. Over defendant’s hearsay objections, the state presented its case based on the 9-1-1 tape, the written statement, and testimony of the investigating officers. At the end of the state’s case, defense moved for judgment of acquittal. The motion was denied. Raegen testified for her husband, contending she made the 9-1-1 call and statement to police because she was angry. She denied that Williams choked her. At the close of defense evidence, the motion for judgment of acquittal was, again, renewed. The district court denied the motion. Williams was found guilty by a jury which recommended he be confined for a term not to exceed five years. Williams appealed.

The Supreme Court, Cady, J., affirms, rejecting arguments by Williams that there was not sufficient evidence to support his conviction and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a confrontation clause objection to the 9-1-1 call and the officers’ testimony.

To convict Williams, the State had to establish that he had choked Raegen. All other elements of the crime were admitted (they were married, living together and had children together). The Court finds there was substantial evidence to support the conviction. “Admissible hearsay can be used to support a conviction just as other admissible evidence. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.803(2) (“A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.”). Additionally, the jury was free to sort out the inconsistency between Raegen’s trial testimony and her prior statements to police. The red mark on Raegen’s face constituted corroborative evidence.”

The Court rejects Williams’ contention that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a confrontation clause objection. Williams relies upon Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004), which was decided four months after his case was tried. The Court observes that it is not clear if Williams’ rights as described in Crawford were violated. It notes that Raegen’s statements are excited utterances and admissible as an exception to hearsay. Also, Williams’ attorney did not breach an essential duty in his representation. (“. . .[C]ounsel is not under a duty of clairvoyance. Morgan v. State, 469 N.W.2d 419, 427 (Iowa 1991); see State v. Liddell, 672 N.W.2d 805, 814 (Iowa 2003) (“‘Counsel need not be a crystal gazer; it is not necessary to know what the law will become in the future to provide effective assistance of counsel.’” (quoting Seethe v. State, 308 N.W.2d 11, 16 (Iowa 1981)).

The Court declines to discuss the application of Crawford to future claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in cases in which the alleged victim of domestic abuse recants testimony. The Court invokes the doctrine of judicial restraint while noting that the issue is one of great interest to both the bench and bar.


Life Estate Is Subject to Claim for Medicaid Reimbursement

In the Matter of the Estate of Ruby Laughhead, Deceased, _____ N.W.2d _____ (Iowa 2005)(No. 40/04-0065)
At the time of her death on July 29, 2002, Ruby Laughhead had a life estate in a Monroe County farm. The value of her life estate was $41,451.75. Prior to her death, the state of Iowa provided payments for her nursing home care in the amount of $137,596.88. Health Care Management Systems, Inc. filed a claim in the Estate for reimbursement. The claim was denied by the administrator. The Iowa District Court for Monroe County held that the life estate was an asset of the probate estate, and the department’s claim would be allowed to the extent of the value of that asset. The court directed the administrator to place in the estate the amount of $41,451.75, plus interest, as provided in Iowa Code section 535.3 (2003). See Iowa Code § 249A.5(2)(e) (stating interest accrues on debt owed by Medicaid recipient at the rate provided in section 535.3 commencing six months after the recipient’s death). The administrator appealed.

The Supreme Court, Ternus, J., finds that under section 249A.5(2), as amended in 2002, the Estate is clearly liable to Medicaid for benefits provided to Ruby. The issue is what assets are includable in the estate to satisfy the claim. The Court holds that whether under the prior version of section 249A.5(2) or the 2002 amended version, the life estate is subject to Medicare’s claims. Iowa Probate Law does not apply to this matter because of the way that the General Assembly wrote the Medicare reimbursement statute. The Court rejects an argument by the remainderman that the claim and the district court order impair his contractual relationship with Ruby. The Court notes:

The flaw in this argument is that the department did not seek to reach Charles’ remainder interest, nor did the district court order that the value of the remainder interest be included in Ruby’s estate. That Charles may receive less upon Ruby’s death than he anticipated can be attributed to the value of Ruby’s life estate, not to the court’s inclusion of his remainder interest in the probate estate. We conclude, therefore, that Charles’ remainder interest is not impaired by subjecting Ruby’s life estate to the department’s repayment claim. Consequently, section 249A.5(2)(c) is not unconstitutional as applied in this case.

The decision of the district court is affirmed.