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Punitive Damage Award Upheld in Interference with Child Custody Case

Wolf v. Wolf, _____ N.W.2d _____ (Iowa 2005)(No.140/02-1992)

The Scott County District Court awarded one dollar actual damages and $25,000 punitive damages to Timothy Wolf against his former wife, Joan Wolf. Timothy Wolf claimed that Joan Wolf tortiously interfered with his custody rights. The district court also entered an award for attorney fees.

The Supreme Court in an opinion written by Justice Jerry Larson affirms both the actual and punitive damage award. The award for attorney fees is reversed.

The Court rejects arguments by Joan Wolf that the district court decision is not support by the evidence, that her conduct was not willful and wanton, and that the punitive damage award is excessive. The Court responds:

We reject Joan’s argument that she was only acting as a good mother by providing Ashley with a protective environment. The court found affirmative acts by her . . . that demonstrated willful and wanton conduct. Joan kept Ashley for nearly three years after Timothy was awarded physical care. During the short period Timothy did have physical care, Joan provided Ashley with the means to run away—showing a disregard for Timothy’s custodial rights and the emotional harm he would likely suffer. When Joan returned to Iowa to seek a modification of physical placement, she disobeyed direct orders from the judge and took Ashley back to Arizona before the proceeding ended. She thereby showed not only a lack of concern for Timothy’s custodial rights, but also displayed a complete disregard for the Iowa legal system. In fact, she has defied Iowa court orders for three years. We believe that clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence supports the district court’s finding of willful and wanton conduct warranting punitive damages.

The Court concludes that in light of Joan’s conduct, the punitive damage award is not excessive and that no mathematical formula to compare actual and punitive damages is practicable (The Court also notes that Timothy Wolf specifically requested a dollar in actual damages to remove any appearance to his daughter that he was motivated by money.).

The award of attorney fees is reversed. The Court finds that to establish a common law right to an attorney fee the plaintiff needed to establish conduct exceeding the punitive damages willful and wanton standard. The opinion states that while Joan Wolf’s actions were “clearly willful and demonstrated a wanton disregard for [Timothy] Wolf’s rights . . . the evidence [does not] meet the heightened standard of oppression or connivance” required by Iowa law.

Criminal Conviction for Attempting to Entice Away a Minor Reversed and Remanded
State v. Quinn, _____ N.W.2d _____ (Iowa 2005)(No. 149/03-1643)

Ryan Patrick Quinn was found guilty following a bench trial in the Iowa District Court for Scott County on charges of attempting to entice away a minor. Section 710.10(3), Iowa Code (2003). Quinn was arrested at his home in Davenport after police determined he was the man who tried to convince an 8 year old girl to come over to his car. At the time, the little girl was riding her bicycle in the driveway of her family’s home in Walcott. During their investigation, police were told by Quinn that he obtained sexual gratification by having eye contact with girls.

At trial Quinn objected to the district court using an inference permitted by section 710.10(4), Iowa Code (2003). The law provided that intent to commit a violation of section 710.10 “may be inferred when the person is not know to the person being enticed away and the person does not have the permission of the parent, guardian, or custodian to contact the person being enticed away”. Quinn contended this inference violated his Constitutional rights, including the right to free speech, and the provision was overbroad on its face and as applied.

The Supreme Court, in a decision written by Chief Justice Louis Lavorato, observes that there was substantial evidence produced at trial to support the contention that Quinn attempted to entice the little girl away for the purpose of performing an illegal act. The Court remands the case to the district court for new findings of fact and conclusions within reference to the inference. The Court finds the inference is unconstitutional on its face and as applied:

Simply put . . .a person who speaks to a minor described in section 710.10(3) may be arrested, prosecuted, and convicted for violating section 710.10(3) merely upon proof of the act of speaking with such minor, which without more, is protected under the First Amendment. . . .

Moreover, the inference here tends to shift the burden of proof to the defendant and penalizes a defendant who, as here, does not testify. The tendency in these circumstances is for the fact finder to convict unless the defendant has an explanation as to why he spoke to the minor. . . .

A Conviction in which the Individual Was Not Represented by Counsel Can Be Used to Enhance a Subsequent Criminal Charge
State v. Allen, _____ N.W.2d _____ (Iowa 2005)(No. 143/03-1947)

Prosecutors in Black Hawk County charged Robert Allen with third offense public intoxication, an aggravated misdemeanor under Iowa law. Section 123.46(2), .91 Iowa Code (2003). Allen did not have an attorney to represent him in one of the previous convictions. He did have an attorney for the other. At trial, Allen contended that under the Iowa Constitution a prior, uncounseled conviction could not be used to enhance a subsequent criminal charge. The district court agreed. Allen was found guilty of second offense public intoxication. He was sentenced to 120 days in jail and fined $250.

On appeal by the State, the Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice Michael Streit, reverses the district court and finds that the Iowa Constitutional does not prohibit use of a prior, uncounseled conviction to enhance a subsequent criminal charge when the conviction did not result in incarceration. Allen argues that use of a prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction violates the Iowa Constitution, but the Court notes neither Allen nor the district court cited any specific provision of the Iowa Constitution to support the proposition. Allen and the district court rely upon an Iowa Supreme Court observation in previous decisions about its own view of the importance of counsel. The Court notes that the decision has been overruled, and the reference in the prior decision was to a plurality opinion of the United States Supreme Court which, too, has been overruled. The Court finds that use of the prior conviction in which Allen did not have an attorney and in which he was not incarcerated does not violate either Iowa’s right to counsel provision or the due process concepts under the Iowa Constitution.

Contract Does Not Include Indemnification for Negligence
Maxim Technologies, Inc. v. The City of Dubuque, _____ N.W.2d _____ (Iowa 2005)(No. 139/03-1355)

Maxim Technologies was hired by the City of Dubuque to monitor construction of a parking ramp. Owners of adjacent buildings sued Maxim, the City and others contending that work on the project had caused damage. A jury found Maxim liable. Maxim argued that under its contract, the City was required to indemnify it. The City contended the contract applied only to environmental matters. The Iowa District Court for Dubuque County dismissed Maxim’s claims. Maxim appealed.

The Supreme Court in another decision written by Justice Michael Streit affirms the district court. The opinion notes, “Maxim drafted the terms and conditions, which were printed in a font small enough to make even the youngest eyes feel old; there are approximately sixty lines and fifteen hundred words on each page.” The Court then finds that the provision which Maxim drafted is clear and unambiguous. It applies to environmental issues. Further, there is a special rule that applies when a party asserts indemnification from its own negligence. The rule requires that such intent be clearly and unambiguously expressed. It was not.

Executor Did Not Have a Duty to File an Amended Inheritance Tax Return
Haney v. Kitchen, _____ N.W.2d _____ (Iowa 2005)(No. 137/03-1522)

The 1994 Will of Sylvia Kitchen provided that the bulk of her estate was to go to a niece, Janice Sanders, and her late-husband’s nephew, Eallen Kitchen. Eallen was named executor. Other heirs filed a will contest based upon a 1993 will. Inheritance tax return was submitted about two months after it was due. Inheritance taxes were almost $98,000. Over $95,500 of the taxes were attributed to the shares of Jancie Sanders and Eallen Kitchen.

In December 1999, a jury concluded the 1994 will was the result of undue influence. Appeal was filed, and a supersedeas bond posted.

On at least three occasions while the appeal was pending, the objectors asked for an amended inheritance tax return to be filed. It was not. In 2002, the Supreme Court denied further review of the will contest. Eallen Kitchen resigned as executor. The successor personal representative filed an amended inheritance tax return seeking refund of over $87,000. The application was denied by the Department of Revenue because it was not timely. Suit is filed against Eallen Kitchen for failing to file an amended return. The district court held he did not have a duty to file an amended return. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court affirms.

In the opinion by Justice David Wiggins, the Court notes that Eallen Kitchen as executor had primary duty to file the inheritance tax return. When he refused to file an amended return, the beneficiary had a right to file an amended return. The Court writes, “Each time the Objectors requested Eallen to file an amended return, the Objectors, through Tod Haney, could have filed an amended tax return reflecting a tax liability consistent with the position the Objectors were taking in the litigation.”


Insurance Proceeds from Damage Claimed to Homestead are Exempt from Creditor
In the Matter of the Estate of Tolson, _____ N.W.2d _____ (Iowa 2005)(No. 151/03-1808)

The Supreme Court finds that the Iowa District Court for Clinton County as in error when it held that insurance proceeds from a homeowner’s policy were found to be subject to creditors and not exempt. The Court’s opinion by Justice Mark Cady notes that the policy covered deceased’s homestead. The purpose of the policy was to provide money to make repairs caused by damage (In this case a water pipe broke in the house causing extensive damage.). The funds are exempt and not subject to the claims of creditors for a reasonable period of time. The Court writes, “When an exempt homestead is damages or destroyed, the insurance proceeds from the damage or destruction are exempt from creditor claims for a reasonable period of time, which begins when the owner of the homestead received the proceeds.”