Supreme Court of Iowa Decision

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Case Title: Summary

Date: 05/13/2005

Number:

Decision: Listen to Audio Summary approximately 4 minutes in length.

Summary
Decisions of the Iowa Supreme Court
Filed on May 13, 2005
Prepared for the Iowa State Bar Association by
George F. Davison, Jr., J.D.
Š2005 The Iowa State Bar Association and George F. Davison, Jr., J.D.

Class Certifications in Claims Against Microsoft Upheld

Comes v. Microsoft Corp., _____ N.W.2d _____ (Iowa 2005)(No. 16/03-1703)
The decision by a Polk County district court to certify two classes of plaintiffs who claim violations of the Iowa competition law by Microsoft is affirmed in a decision written by Larson, J. The two classes of plaintiffs (one is an operating-systems software class, and the other is an applications software class.) represent persons who purchased computers with Microsoft operating systems and application software preinstalled. The plaintiffs contend that Microsoft used monopolistic practices between 1994 and 2001 to artificially inflate the cost of its products, including licenses for operating systems and applications.

Arguments by Microsoft that the named plaintiffs fail to meet the requirements for a class action and certification under Iowa law are rejected. The Court reviews the standards for class certification found in the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure. See, Iowa R.Civ.P. 1.261, et cet. It rejects each argument presented by Microsoft that the class representatives are not suitable, do not have interests in the case, and that the district court was wrong when it certified the class. The Court finds that common issues of law predominate the claims against Microsoft. The Court specifically rejects contends by Microsoft that the district court was wrong when it approved an attorney fee contact between counsel for the plaintiffs and the class representatives and then considered the fee contract on the issue of whether or not the class representatives “have or can acquire adequate financial resources . . . to ensure that the interests of the class will not be harmed.” Iowa R.Civ.P. 1.263(2)(c). The Court rejects Microsoft’s contention that the fee contract and procedure used by the district court violates DR 5-103(B). The Court notes that DR 5-103(B) has been changed and that under all the circumstances of this case, the plaintiffs have established their ability to provide financial resources, and they will adequately represent the interests of the two classes.

District Court Dismissal of Medical Malpractice Claim on Statute of Limitations Defense Affirmed

Ratcliff v. Graether, _____ N.W.2d _____, (Iowa 2005)(No. 41/03-1816)
Bruce Ratcliff had LASIK surgery on his left eye on April 30, 1997. John Graether, M.D. of Wolfe Clinic, P.C. performed the surgery (Earlier surgery on the right eye had been very successful.). After the surgery Ratcliff’s left eye was “very clouded” and “terrible”. In May 1997, Ratcliff was told a cataract was forming and that was the reason for the vision problems. He continued to treat with Dr. Graether and another doctor at Wolfe Clinic, and then, in December 1997, he saw another eye specialist, who indicated that the vision problems might be related to the LASIX procedure.

Ratcliff filed suit in the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County on November 16, 2000 (This is over three years after the surgery and close to three years after he obtained a second opinion.). Defendants (Dr. Graether and Wolfe Clinic) filed summary judgment based upon a number of affirmative defenses, including the two year statute of limitations found in Iowa Code section 614.1(9). Initially the district court denied the Motion for Summary Judgment, agreeing with the plaintiff that the continuous treatment doctrine tolled the statute of limitations. After a second Motion for Summary Judgment from the defendants, the district court granted the Motion and dismissed the case. The district court agreed with the defendants that the single act exception (in this case the act of negligence was the surgery on the left eye in April 1997.) applied, and the plaintiff failed to file his lawsuit within the applicable statute of limitations. The plaintiff appealed.

The Supreme Court in an opinion by Lavorato, C.J., affirms. The Court notes,
“Here, by Ratcliff’s own admission, he was aware of an eye problem on May 1, 1997, the day following surgery on his left eye. He was on inquiry notice at that point which charged him with knowledge of facts that would have been disclosed by a reasonably diligent investigation. And by his own admission, he knew on May 13, 1997 that there might have been an overcorrection when Graether told him so. Finally, by his own admission, when he left Mauer’s [the doctor from whom Ratcliff sought a second opinion] office in December 1997, he knew that Mauer believed the April 30, 1997 procedure was the cause of his visual problems in his left eye.”
(Emphasis in original). The Court finds the continuous treatment doctrine does not apply to the facts of this case. The Court declines the opportunity to adopt the continuous treatment doctrine. The Court concludes that the district court was correct when it granted Summary Judgment for the defendants on the statute of limitations defense.

Finding that $50 a Day for Room and Board in the Lucas County Jail Is Reasonable Is Affirmed

State v. Abrahamson, _____ N.W.2d _____ (Iowa 2005)(No. 35/03-1907)
A group of inmates from the Lucas County Jail contended the Lucas County District Court was wrong when it found that $50 a day for room and board during their periods of incarceration was reasonable. After a hearing on a motion by the sheriff for restitution, See, section 356.7, Iowa Code, the Lucas County District Court found that each of the inmates should pay the charge.

The Supreme Court, Larson, J., finds that this case turns on interpretation of section 356.7, Iowa Code, and its interaction with the restitution provisions of section 910.2 and 910.3. The inmates contend that language in section 356.7(3) is a “rubber stamp” that merely requires the district court to sign an order approving the claims made by the sheriff. The Supreme Court rejects this contention noting that the inmates received a hearing and the district court considered all factors it was required to under section 910.3:
The court found that the number of days charged was correct (a fact conceded by the defendants), the amount requested by the sheriff was “necessary, fair, and reasonable,” and the claims were timely under section 910.3. The court also analyzed and rejected the defendants’ constitutional challenges to section 356.7. The court dealt with the defendants’ ability-to-pay issue by providing that they could file a separate application to have that issue resolved at a later date. See State v. Jackson, 601 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Iowa 1999).
The Court notes the language in section 356.7 that the court “shall approve” room-and-board claims is not a rubber stamp. The district court is to exercise its discretion. The district court did so in this case, and its order is affirmed.

District Court Wrong To Dismiss Charges Against a Trucker With an Overweight Load

State v. Meadows, _____ N.W.2d _____ (Iowa 2005)(No. 37/03-2012)
The Department of Transportation issued a single-trip overweight permit to Jerry Meadows to allow transportation of a rock crusher from Illinois to Nebraska. The route was generally over Interstate 80. In Jasper County, Meadows was to leave the interstate at Colfax, travel over highway 117 to highway 65, and then use highway 65 to return to Interstate 80 (There was a limited load bridge west of Colfax.). Meadows failed to exit at Colfax. The DOT weigh station near Mitchellville was open. At the weigh station, the DOT issued four citations to Meadows, including excessive gross weight. In a Jasper County Attorney proceeding, Meadows argued because of the overweight permit, his only offense was a violation of the permit (i.e., he was permitted to operate overweight, but he had to operate on the roads designated by the permit.). The district court agreed. The state appealed.

The Supreme Court, Carter, J., holds the district court improperly focused on whether defendant’s overload permit was void as a result of leaving the designated route. The Court finds the decisive issue is whether the permit as written allowed Meadows to haul an overweight load over the part of Interstate 80 where he was driving at the time he was charged. The permit did not allow Meadows to be where he was. The district court committed error when it ruled the state could not prosecute for violations of the overweight statute. The case is remanded to district court for further proceedings on the charges.